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ABSTRACT 
 
Due to their inherent properties Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are finding 
their way in diversity of applications. As these are infrastructureless networks, normal 
traditional routing algorithms are not applicable to MANETs. Many routing algorithms 
have been proposed for MANETs till now. Vector Routing Protocol (VRP) is proposed 
for efficient utilization of limited bandwidth in MANETs. 
Providing security to the network layer in MANETs is gaining importance 
nowadays. The two main functions of network layer are ad hoc routing and data 
forwarding. Due to the inherent properties of MANETs there is huge scope to attack on 
functions of network layer. Attacks on network layer can be broadly classified in two 
categories namely routing attacks and packet forwarding attacks. The attacks which try to 
modify the routing data and mislead the routing protocols are treated as routing attacks.  
These attacks are specific to the routing protocol used by the MANETs. Packet 
forwarding attacks on other hand do not disrupt the routing protocol, instead they cause 
the data packets intentionally inconsistent with routing states. Examples of these attacks 
are an intermediate node on the path, dropping the data packet, modifying the contents of 
the packet etc. 
In this Thesis we consider only on packet dropping attack on VRP algorithm. We 
proposed a solution to mitigate the effects of malicious nodes on VRP. Our proposed 
solution „Secured VRP‟ secures the VRP algorithm from malicious nodes. Our Secured 
VRP (SVRP) works far better than VRP in presence of malicious nodes and works 
exactly as VRP in absence of malicious nodes. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is self configuring network formed by 
Mobile hosts. The hosts are connected by wireless links. It is one form of Wireless 
network. Due to arbitrary topologies and mobility of nodes in the network, these 
networks are called Mobile Ad-hoc Networks.  
MANETs have striking differences with Cellular Networks (another kind 
wireless network). The basic difference is Cellular networks have pre constructed 
infrastructure made of fixed and wired nodes. These fixed and wired nodes are called as 
base stations. The base stations act as access points, and communication between two 
nodes completely rely on wired backbone and fixed base stations. In a MANET no 
structure exists, hence these are called Infrastructureless networks. 
In MANETs a network is formed dynamically through the cooperation of an 
arbitrary set of independent nodes. There is no prearrangement regarding the specific 
role each node should assume. Instead, each node makes its decision independently, 
based on the network situation, without using a preexisting network infrastructure. 
As per IETF MANET working group the following are salient characteristics of 
MANETs:  
 1. Dynamic Topologies 
 All nodes in the network are free to move arbitrarily making the 
network topology to change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable times. 
The topology may consist of both bidirectional and unidirectional links.  
 2. Bandwidth constrained, Variable capacity links 
Wireless links will continue to have significantly lower capacity 
when compared to traditional hardwired links. The realized throughput of 
wireless communications after accounting for the effects of multiple 
access, fading, noise and interface conditions, is often much less than a 
radio‟s maximum transmission rate.   
3. Energy constrained operation 
Some or all of the nodes in a MANET may relay on batteries or 
other exhaustible means for their energy. For these nodes, the most 
important system design criteria for optimization may be energy 
conservation.  
Chapter 
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4. Limited Physical Security 
Mobile wireless networks are generally more prone physical 
security attacks than are fixed ones. Existing link security techniques are 
often applied to reduce security threats.  
Due to the above properties, normal traditional algorithms developed for wired 
networks are not applicable to MANET‟s. All routing algorithms should consider all the 
above properties.  
 
 
1.2   MOTIVATION 
As mentioned in previous section routing algorithms should consider all the 
properties. Many proposed algorithms tried to concentrate on few properties only. For 
this reason only we are having different categories of algorithms like Bandwidth efficient 
algorithms, Energy efficient algorithms and Secured Routing algorithms.  
In our study we came across Vector Routing Protocol (VRP). This algorithm is 
proven to be bandwidth efficient algorithm. Like other algorithms success of VRP 
depends on cooperative nodes. This property (believing other nodes) makes VRP 
vulnerable to security attacks. The concept of malicious nodes is discussed by Marti. In 
this paper Marti studied the effect of malicious nodes on DSR algorithm and proposed a 
solution to mitigate the effects of malicious nodes. This work motivated us to study the 
effects of malicious nodes on VRP algorithm.  
 
 
1.3    THESIS OUTLINE 
The organization of rest of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss some 
Basic Cryptography preliminaries. In Chapter 3, we have described some routing 
algorithms like DSDV, AODV, DSR and VRP. In Chapter 4, we discussed two related 
exiting works which paved us way for our proposal. Chapter 5 discusses our solution and 
simulation results. We have concluded our thesis with future scopes followed by a 
number of references.  
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2.1   INTRODUCTION 
 Cryptography is the science of using mathematics to encrypt and decrypt data. 
Cryptography enables you to store sensitive information or transmit it across insecure 
networks (like the Internet) so that it cannot be read by anyone except the intended 
recipient. 
While cryptography is the science of securing data, cryptanalysis is the science of 
analyzing and breaking secure communication. Classical cryptanalysis involves an 
interesting combination of analytical reasoning, application of mathematical tools, 
pattern finding, patience, determination, and luck. Although in the past cryptography 
referred only to the encryption and decryption of messages using secret keys, today it is 
defined as involving four distinct mechanisms: Symmetric and asymmetric Encryption, 
Hashing, Digital signatures and Public Key Infrastructure. The following sections 
explain these mechanisms. 
 
2.2   SYMMETRIC AND ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION  
 
Encryption is the process of encoding a text so that its original meaning is lost. 
Decryption is the opposite process, a mechanism to reveal the original message from the 
encrypted one. The term encipher and decipher are used respectively. The original or 
unaltered version of the message is termed as plain text and the encrypted message is 
called cipher text. 
 
2.2.1   SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION 
 
It is the simplest but very efficient form of encryption. Here one secret is shared 
between the communicating parties (say Alice and Bob). The encryption and decryption 
procedures are mirror image of each other. Two parties communicating with symmetric 
encryption can be explained with the following figure 2.1 [14]: 
The most challenging task in symmetric encryption is to distribute and manage 
the shared secret (Key). DES is an example of symmetric encryption. 
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Figure 2.1 Symmetric Encryption (Adopted from [14]) 
  
2.2.2   ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION 
 
Unlike the symmetric encryption it uses two separate keys for encryption and 
decryption. So keys come in pair called private-public key pair. The sender encrypts the 
message with his private key. Prior to this operation sender must send its corresponding 
public key to the receiver. On receiving the encrypted text, the public key is used to 
decipher the original plain text. The major advantage is in asymmetric encryption lies 
with the fact that it incurs quite high computational expense for an attacker. But on the 
other hand its application is limited where both security and efficiency are deserved. 
RSA is a good example of public key encryption. 
Another problem lies with asymmetric encryption, as it demands a huge number 
of key pair for a large network. A good comparative discussion between symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption can be found in [14] and [15] 
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Cryptography Preliminaries 
  
Secured VRP for MANETs in presence of Malicious Nodes   5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Asymmetric Encryption (Adopted form [14]) 
    
2.3   CRYPTOGRAPHY HASH FUNCTION  
For secure communication it is required that data transmitted is not altered by any 
entity. Hash functions are the security primitives that ensure data integrity. Hash function 
is often called one-way hash function, because it is quite difficult to compute the inverse 
function. For example, the cube function y=x3 it is quite easy to compute y given x. But 
the inverse function, 3√y is much complicated to compute. 
The most common use of hash function is digital signature and data integrity. It is 
also used for entity authentication [14]. With digital signature hash function is applied to 
the whole message. Then the hashed value is signed. On receiving the hash value is 
recomputed and verifies that the received signature is unaltered and from the original 
source. It saves both time and space as only the hashed value is signed instead of the 
whole message. 
Key Source K1 
Encryption:             
EK1 (M) = C 
 
Plain Text 
Source 
Destination 
Decryption:       
Dk2(C) = M 
Encryption Key Decryption Key 
K2 
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For integrity of data it is widely used. Sender computes the hashed value over the 
data and sends it along with the original message to the receiver. The destination entity 
recomputes the hash value from the transmitted message and compares with the hashed 
value (transmitted) [16]. Hash function can be public (without any key) or it can contain 
key. The most common hash functions are MD5 (Message Digest 5) and SHA (Secure 
Hash Algorithm). 
 
2.4   DIGITAL SIGNATURE  
Digital signature is an important cryptographic primitives used for authentication, 
authorization and non-repudiation [14]. Digital signature has the best use of public key 
cryptography as discussed in section 2.3. An asymmetric encryption algorithm such as 
RSA can be used to create and verify digital signature. The simplest form of the protocol 
works as follows: 
1. Alice encrypts the document with her private key, thereby singing the 
document 
2. Alice sends the signed document to Bob 
3. Bob deciphers the document with Alice‟s public key, thereby verifying 
the signature. 
The strength of the digital signature lies with the fact that although the public-
private key pair for asymmetric encryption is mathematically related, it is 
computationally infeasible to derive the private key from the corresponding public key. 
Another fundamental process, termed a "hash function," is used in both creating 
and verifying a digital signature. It has been already discussed in section 2.3. 
A digital signature must meet the following two properties [15] 
 It must be unforgeable. If an entity sings a document M with signature 
S(M), it is not possible for other entity to produce the same pair <M, 
S(M)> 
 It must be authentic. If someone R receives a digital signature from S, R 
must be able to verify that the signature is really from S. 
In reality digital signature creation and verification are performed using the 
combination of hash function and asymmetric encryption. 
To create a digital signature the sender first computes the message authentication 
code (MAC) or hash of the original message and append the code with the message. 
Then the hash code is encrypted using asymmetric encryption. 
Cryptography Preliminaries 
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Figure 2.3 Digital Signature  
 
On the reception end the receiver uses the same hash algorithm to compute the 
hash code of the message and decrypts the encrypted message using the corresponding 
public key and compares the hash value. The process is illustrated in the figure 2.3 
 
2.5   PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
One of the major security flaws of the pure digital signature is that it is totally 
based on public and private keys. For example, suppose Alice and Bob are 
communicating. It is quite possible that the public key of Alice may be captured by some 
unwanted entity. Therefore the signed document can be decrypted by the attacker. Even 
worse case occurs when the attacker steals the key and impersonate as Bob with Alice. 
There is no assurance that the public key sent by Alice to Bob is really Alice‟s public 
key. 
In order to solve the above problems the concept of public key infrastructure 
(PKI) has been introduced. It involves the central certification authority often termed as 
CA. Here Alice and Bob can securely communicate as follow: Alice requests to get the 
public key of Bob from the CA, and Bob also requests for Alice‟s public key. Now they 
     Sender       Receiver 
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can securely transfer document maintaining the integrity and authenticity of the 
document.  
The primary purpose of PKI is to distribute public key and certificates with 
security and integrity [17]. A PKI is a basement on which applications and network 
security components are built. The success of most of the e-commerce based applications 
is dependent on the PKI. 
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3.1   INTRODUCTION 
MANET routing has received huge attention from research community. Due to 
inherent properties as specified in previous chapter, traditional routing techniques cannot 
be applied for MANETs. The problem of routing in network has two components: route 
discovery and route maintenance. Based on route maintenance routing can be broadly 
classified into two categories namely proactive and reactive algorithms.  
In proactive algorithms routes are maintained up-to-date. Topology updates are 
propagated throughout the network to maintain a consistent view of the network. 
Keeping routes for all destinations has the advantage that communication with arbitrary 
destinations experiences minimal initial delay. The disadvantage of these algorithms is in 
dynamic environment more control packets are involved to maintain consistent topology.  
Reactive routing protocols like Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad Hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV) only react when a route is needed between a source 
and a destination node, and they do not need to try and maintain routes to destinations 
that they are not communicating with. 
 
3.2 DESTINATION SEQUEENCED DISTANT VECTOR (DSDV) ROUTING 
DSDV [2] is a distance vector routing protocol that builds and maintains routing 
tables at each network node. This routing table contains the next hop for, and the total 
number of hops to, all reachable destinations. As previously stated, DSDV tries to 
maintain and keep all routing tables completely updated for all connections at all times. 
It achieves this by periodically sending out updates to all nodes, a network flood–type 
situation. DSDV also uses a hop count and sequence number strategy for routes along its 
network. This is a combination method that shows how fresh and short a route is. For 
instance, consider a route A. This route will be considered more favorable than another 
route, say route B, if either A had a higher sequence number, indicating that it is a 
fresher route, or if they both had the same sequence number, indicating that route A has a 
lower hop count. Essentially, the use of sequence numbers helps prevent routing loops 
when broken links occur. Consider a situation where a route is found to be redundant, 
and it can no longer be reached. As DSDV broadcasts any change within a network, this 
redundant information will not remain for very long and potentially waste time and 
bandwidth. A node along the route would detect the redundant route. Information 
Chapter 
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comprising an infinite hop count would be relayed to the destination node, to enable the 
destination to increase the sequence number to valid routes by one. Johansson et al[3] 
investigated this and the following two main leading routing protocols and came to the 
conclusion that DSDV is not suitable for wireless ad hoc routing environments, due to a 
number of failings in the testing carried out. DSDV performs poorly in situations with 
increased mobility, a metric that helps simulate moving nodes. Because of the way that 
the DSDV protocol works, it struggles in maintaining valid routes to every node, and lost 
packets will result. Also, as the network in the simulations grew larger, the protocol had 
substantial difficulties handling the increased network load as a result of increased 
updates. 
 
3.3   DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING 
Dynamic source routing [4] is based on source routing, where the source specifies 
the complete path to the destination in the packet and each node along this path simply 
forwards the packet to the next hop indicated in the path. It utilizes a route cache where 
routes it has learned so far are cached. Therefore, a source first checks its route cache to 
determine the route to the destination. If a route is found, the source uses this route. 
Otherwise, the source uses a route discovery protocol to discover a route. 
 
In route discovery, the source floods a query packet through the ad hoc network, 
and the reply is returned by either the destination or another host that can complete the 
query from its route cache. Each query packet has a unique ID and an initially empty list. 
On receiving a query packet, if a node has already seen this ID (i.e., duplicate) or it finds 
its own address already recorded in the list, it discards the copy and stops flooding; 
otherwise, it appends its own address in the list and broadcasts the query to its neighbors. 
If a node can complete the query from its route cache, it may send a reply packet to the 
source without propagating the query packet further. Furthermore, any node participating 
in route discovery can learn routes from passing data packets and gather this routing 
information into its route cache. 
 
A route failure can be detected by the link-level protocol (i.e., hop by hop 
acknowledgments) or it may be inferred when no broadcasts have been received for a 
while from a former neighbor. When a route failure is detected, the node detecting the 
failure sends an error packet to the source, which then initiates route discovery protocol 
Routing Algorithms 
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again to discover a new route. In DSR, no periodic control messages are used for route 
maintenance. 
 
The major advantage of DSR is that there is little or no routing overhead when a 
single source or a few sources communicate with infrequently accessed destinations. In 
such a situation, it does not make sense to maintain routes from all sources to such 
destinations. Furthermore, because communication is assumed to be infrequent, a lot of 
topological changes may occur without triggering new route discoveries. 
 
Even though DSR is suitable for the environment where only a few sources 
communicate with infrequently accessed destinations, it may result in large delay and 
large communication overhead in highly dynamic environments with frequent 
communication requirements [5]. Moreover, DSR may have a scalability problem [6]. As 
the network becomes larger, control packets and message packets also become larger 
because they need to carry addresses for every node in the path. This may be a problem 
as ad hoc networks have limited available bandwidth. 
 
3.4   AD HOC ON-DEMAND DISTANCE VECTOR (AODV) ROUTING  
The Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector [7] routing protocol shares DSR‟s on-
demand characteristics in that it also discovers routes on an “as needed” basis via a 
similar route discovery process. However, AODV adopts a very different mechanism to 
maintain routing information. It uses traditional routing tables, with one entry per 
destination. This is a departure from DSR, which can maintain multiple route cache 
entries for each destination. Without source routing, AODV relies on routing table 
entries to propagate a route reply back to the source and, subsequently, to route data 
packets to the destination. AODV uses sequence numbers maintained at each destination 
to determine freshness of routing information and to prevent routing loops. These 
sequence numbers are carried by all routing packets. 
 
When a route is needed, a node broadcasts a route request message. The response 
message is then echoed back once the request message reaches the destination or an 
intermediate node finds a fresh route to the destination. For each route, a node also 
maintains a list of those neighbors actively using the route. A link breakage causes 
immediate link failure notifications to be sent to the affected neighbors. Similar to 
DSDV, each route table entry is tagged with a destination sequence number to avoid loop 
Routing Algorithms 
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formation. Moreover, nodes are not required to maintain routes that are not active. Thus, 
wireless resources can be effectively utilized. However, because flooding is used for 
route search, communication overhead for route search is not scalable for large networks. 
As route maintenance considers only the link breakage and ignores the link creation, the 
route may become nonoptimal when network topology changes. Subsequent global route 
search is needed when the route is broken. 
 
An important feature of AODV is maintenance of timer-based states in each 
node, regarding utilization of individual routing table entries. A routing table entry 
expires if not used recently. A set of predecessor nodes is maintained for each routing 
table entry, indicating the set of neighboring nodes that use that entry to route data 
packets. These nodes are notified with route error packets when the next hop link breaks. 
Each predecessor node, in turn, forwards the route error to its own set of predecessors, 
thus effectively erasing all routes using the broken link. 
 
The specification of AODV in Parkins et al[8], includes an optimization 
technique to control the route request flood in the route discovery process. It uses an 
expanding ring search initially to discover routes to an unknown destination. In the 
expanding ring search, increasingly larger neighborhoods are searched to find the 
destination. The search is controlled by the TTL field in the IP header of the route 
request packets. If the route to a previously known destination is needed, the prior hop-
wise distance is used to optimize the search. 
 
3.5   VECTOR ROUTING PROTOCOL (VRP)  
Vector Routing Protocol [1] is proved to be bandwidth efficient algorithm. It 
works in two phases namely start up phase and maintenance phase. Each node in the 
network has three vectors namely neighborhood, access and routing vectors. 
Neighborhood vector of a node stores the information of its neighbor nodes, while access 
vector stores accessibility information. Routing vector stores the routing information. In 
the network of n nodes, each node is given unique identity in the range 0 to n-1. The three 
vectors of a node are of length n. The access, neighborhood and routing vectors of node u 
are denoted as follows 
 
0 1 2 1( , , ,......, )
u u u u u
na a a a a  
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0 1 2 1( , , ,......, )
u u u u u
nv v v v v  
 
       0 1 2 1( , , ,......, )
u u u u u
nr r r r r  
 
The neighborhood vector of node u denoted by v
u
 has n bits. If node i is neighbor 
of node u then the i
th
 bit denoted as vi
u
 is set to 1 else its value is 0. Initially all bits in this 
vector is set 0, except vu
u
 =1. 
The access vector of node u denoted by a
u
 has n bits. If node i is having route 
from node u then the i
th
 bit denoted as ai
u
 is set to 1 else its value is 0. Initially all bits in 
this vector is set 0, except ai
u
 =1. 
The routing vector of node u denoted by r
u
 has n numbers. If node i is having 
route from node u then the i
th
 bit denoted as ri
u
 has the id of the next node along the path 
to destination node i. Initially  ri
u
 = u for all i and u in between 0 and 1.  
Routing information is computed in two phases. The first phase called Start Up 
phase is performed only once. It is performed when the network is activated for the first 
time. In first stage of this phase, each node broadcasts „hello‟ messages to detect its 
neighbor nodes. When node u receives a „hello‟ message from neighboring node i it sets  
vi
u
 =1. After detecting all neighbor nodes, the two vectors a
u
 and r
u
 are updated using (1) 
and (2) respectively. 
 
............................................(1)u ua v  
 
, 1
0
...............................(2)
u
i
u
i
i if vu
i u if v
r
 
 
 
As a next stage, each node u sends its a
u
 to every neighboring node w, and waits 
to receive a
w
 from them. When u receives the vector a
w
, it updates the two vectors a
u
 and 
r
u
 using (3) and (4). After updating a new stage starts, that is node u sends the new a
u
 to 
neighboring node w and waits to receive a
w
. When node receives the vector a
w
, it updates 
the two vectors a
u
 and r
u
. This process continues until each bit in vector a
u
 is 1 if network 
is not partitioned or the value of a
u
 remains unchanged if network is partitioned. 
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The following figure 3.1 describes the Start-up phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Start-Up Phase (Adopted from [1]) 
 
 
Algorithm VRP (Start-up Phase) 
// executed by every node u in the network 
  Initialize vectors: a
u
, v
u
 and r
u
 
  Each node u broadcasts hello messages 
  When receiving a hello message from node i { 
   Set vi
u
 = 1, ai
u
 = 1 and ri
u
 = i } 
  After detecting all neighbors send au to every node w  
such that (vw
u
 = 1) 
  Set DONE = false 
  Repeat the following steps until DONE  
or (ai
u
 = 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n-1) { 
   Set DONE = true 
   Receive a
w
 from every node w such that vw
u
 = 1 
   For every pair of nodes w and i such that (ai
u
 = 0)  
and (ai
w
 = 1) { 
    Set DONE = false, ai
u
 = 1, and ri
u
 = w } 
   Send a
u
 to node w such that vw
u
 = 1 } 
End VRP (Start-up Phase) 
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Maintenance phase is triggered when node u detects a change in the set of 
neighboring nodes. When a node u detects that the node y, which is one of its 
neighboring nodes, is out of its transmission range, it immediately updates the three 
elements ay
u
 =0, vy
u
 =0 and ry
u
 = u, and then it sends to its neighboring nodes. On the 
other hand, when the node u detects the existence of a new neighboring node y, it 
updates the vectors ay
u
 =1, vy
u
 =1 and ry
u
 = y then it sends to the neighboring nodes if 
ay
u
 was zero before update. 
Each time node u receives a
w
 from a neighboring node w it updates the two 
vectors a
u
 and r
u
 using (3) and (5). Then it sends a
u
 to the neighboring nodes only if the 
received vector a
w
 is different from a
u
 before update. 
 
, 0 1
, 0
............................(5)
u w
i i
w u
i i
w if a and au
i u if a and r w
r
 
 
The following figure 3.2 describes the working of Maintenance phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm VRP (maintenance phase) 
// maintenance phase is executed by every node u in the network 
if node u detects node y as a new neighbor { 
  if ay
u
 = 1 { 
   set vy
u
 = 1 and ry
u
 = y; } 
  else { 
   Set ay
u
 = 1, vy
u 
= 1and ry
u
 = y 
   Send a
u
 to node w and receive a
w
 from node w  
such that vw
u
 = 1 }} 
If node u detects that node y is not in its neighborhood { 
Set ay
u
 = 0, vy
u 
= 0and ry
u
 = u 
Send a
u
 to node w and receive a
w
 from node w 
 such that vw
u
 = 1 } 
Continue…….. 
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Figure 3.2: Maintenance Phase (Adopted from[1]) 
 
 
If node u receives a
w 
from neighboring node w 
     If a
u
 ≠ aw { 
         For every pair of nodes w and i  
such that (ai
u 
= 1) and (ai
w
 = 0) and (ri
w
 = w) { 
              Set ai
u
 = 0 and ri
u
 = u } 
         For every pair of nodes w and i such that (ai
u
 = 0) and (ai
w
 = 1) { 
              Set ai
u
 = 1 and ri
u
 = w } 
         Send a
u
 to node w and receive a
w
 from node w such that vw
u
 = 1 } 
End VRP (maintenance phase) 
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4.1   INTRODUCTION 
 Security in a MANET is an essential component for basic network functions like 
packet forwarding and routing: network operation can be easily jeopardized if 
countermeasures are not embedded into basic network functions at the early stages of 
their design. Unlike networks using dedicated nodes to support basic functions like 
packet forwarding, routing, and network management, in ad hoc networks those 
functions are carried out by all available nodes. This very difference is at the core of the 
security problems that are specific to ad hoc networks. As opposed to dedicated nodes of 
a classical network, the nodes of an ad hoc network cannot be trusted for the correct 
execution of critical network functions. 
If an a priori trust relationship exists between the nodes of an ad hoc network, 
entity authentication can be sufficient to assure the correct execution of critical network 
functions. A priori trust can only exist in a few special scenarios like military networks 
and corporate networks, where a common, trusted authority manages the network, and it 
requires tamper-proof hardware for the implementation of critical functions. Entity 
authentication in a large network, on the other hand, raises key management 
requirements. An environment where a common, trusted authority exists is called a 
managed environment. 
When tamper-proof hardware and strong authentication infrastructure are not 
available, for example, in an open environment where a common authority that regulates 
the network does not exist, any node of an ad hoc network can endanger the reliability of 
basic functions like routing. The correct operation of the network requires not only the 
correct execution of critical network functions by each participating node but it also 
requires that each node performs a fair share of the functions. The latter requirement 
seems to be a strong limitation for wireless mobile nodes in which power saving is a 
major concern. The threats considered in the MANET scenario are thus not limited to 
maliciousness; a new type of misbehavior called selfishness should also be taken into 
account to eliminate nodes that simply do not cooperate. 
With lack of a priori trust, classical network security mechanisms based on 
authentication and access control cannot cope with selfishness, and cooperative security 
schemes seem to offer the only reasonable solution. In a cooperative security scheme, 
Chapter 
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node misbehavior can be detected through the collaboration between a number of nodes, 
assuming that a majority of nodes do not misbehave. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the various 
types of possible on existing protocols. Section 4.3 discusses the various secured routing 
protocols briefly. In section 4.4 we discuss the packet dropping attack and counter 
measures taken for that attack. In this section we discuss two solutions which paved way 
for our solution for VRP algorithm. 
 
4.2   ATTACKS ALLOWED BY EXISTING ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
 
 Current ad hoc routing protocols are basically exposed to two different types of 
attacks: active attacks and passive attacks. An attack is considered to be active when the 
misbehaving node has to bear some energy costs in order to perform the threat, whereas 
passive attacks are mainly due to lack of cooperation, with the purpose of saving energy 
selfishly. Nodes that perform active attacks with the aim of damaging other nodes by 
causing network outages are considered to be malicious whereas nodes that perform 
passive attacks with the aim of saving battery life for their own communications are 
considered to be selfish. 
Malicious nodes can disrupt the correct functioning of a routing protocol by 
modifying routing information, by fabricating false routing information, and by 
impersonating other nodes. On the other side, selfish nodes can severely degrade 
network performance and eventually partition the network (X) by simply not 
participating to the network operation. Below is the brief description of various types of 
attacks on MANETs as specified in [18]. 
Threats Using Impersonation : Current ad hoc routing protocols do not authenticate 
routing packets, a malicious node can launch many attacks in a network by 
masquerading as another node (spoofing). Spoofing occurs when a malicious node 
misrepresents its identity in order to alter the vision of the network topology that a 
benign node can gather. As an example, a spoofing attack allows one to create loops in 
routing information collected by a node with the result of partitioning the network. 
Threats Using Fabrication : The notation “fabrication” is used when referring to attacks 
performed by generating false routing messages. Such kinds of attacks can be difficult to 
identify as they come as valid routing constructs, especially in the case of fabricated 
routing error messages claiming that a neighbor can no longer be contacted. 
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Lack of Cooperation: A selfish node that wants to save battery life for its own 
communication can endanger the correct network operation by simply not participating 
in the routing protocol or by not executing the packet forwarding (this attack is also 
known as the black hole attack) . Current ad hoc routing protocols cannot cope with the 
selfishness problem and network performances severely degrade as a result. 
The attacks on network layer in MANETs can be broadly classified into two 
categories namely routing attacks and packet forwarding attacks. The attacks which 
target the function of routing are called routing attacks. Routing attacks are specific to 
different routing protocols. Packet dropping attacks the packet forwarding operation. 
 
4.3   ROUTING ATTACKS AND SOLUTIONS 
 
For securing from routing attacks, the secure ad hoc routing protocols take the 
proactive approach and enhance the existing ad hoc routing protocols, such as DSR and 
AODV, with security extensions. In these protocols, each mobile node proactively signs 
its routing messages using the cryptographic authentication primitives described in 
chapter 2. By this way, collaborative nodes can efficiently authenticate the legitimate 
traffic and differentiate the unauthenticated packets from outsider attackers. However, an 
authenticated node may have been compromised and controlled by the attacker. 
Therefore, we have to further ensure proper compliance with the routing protocols even 
for an authenticated node. In the following, we describe how different types of routing 
protocols are secured from routing attacks. 
 
4.3.1 ARIADNE:  
Ariadne [11,18], developed by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson is an on-demand secure 
ad hoc routing protocol securing DSR algorithm from routing attacks. It achieves it by 
applying highly efficient symmetric cryptography. In this algorithm is able to 
authenticate the source who initiated route discovery process, source node can 
authenticate each intermediate node on the path to the destination present in the RREP 
message. This algorithm also guarantees that no intermediate node can remove a 
previous node in the node list in the RREQ or RREP messages. 
Though Ariadne provides point-to-point authentication of a routing message 
using a message authentication code (MAC) and a shared key between the two parties, it 
uses the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol for broadcasting messages like RREQ 
and RREP messages. Ariadne copes with routing attacks performed by malicious nodes 
but cannot deal packet dropping attack performed by selfish nodes.  
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In Ariadne, the basic RREQ mechanism is enriched with eight fields used to 
provide authentication and integrity to the routing protocol: 
 
<ROUTE REQUEST, initiator, target, id, time interval, hash chain, node list, MAC list> 
The source node sets the values of fields of initiator, target and id. The time 
interval is the TESLA time interval at the pessimistic expected arrival time of the request 
at the destination. The hash chain is initialized to MACKS, D (initiator, target, ID, time 
interval). The node list and MAC list are initialized to empty lists. 
Any intermediate node A after receiving RREQ packet checks the values of 
<initiator, id> with that of its stored values, to determine if it has already seen a request 
from this same route discovery. If it has, the node discards the packet, as in DSR. The 
node can also discard the packet if its corresponding key is not disclosed yet. If 
everything goes correct, the node updates the request by appending its own address (A) 
to the node list in the request, replaces the hash chain field with H [A, hash chain] and 
appends a MAC of the entire REQUEST to the MAC list. After updating, node A 
rebroadcasts the modified RREQ, as in DSR. 
Destination node authenticates the received RREQ by comparing the hash chain 
field with the calculated hash as given below 
H [ηn, H [ηn–1, H [. . . , H [η1, MACKSD (initiator, target, id, time interval)] . . . ] ] ] 
where ηi is the node address at position i of the node list in the request, and where 
n is the number of nodes in the node list. If there is mismatch it discards the received 
RREQ. If the destination node determines that the request is valid, it returns a RREP to 
the source, containing eight fields: 
 
<ROUTE REPLY, target, initiator, time interval, node list, MAC list, target MAC, key 
list> 
The fields starting from target to MAC list are set to the corresponding values 
from the RREQ message. The target MAC is set to a MAC computed on the preceding 
fields in the reply with the key KDS, and the key list is initialized to the empty list. The 
RREP is then returned to the initiator of the request along the source route obtained by 
reversing the sequence of hops in the node list of the request. 
An intermediate node after receiving the RREP waits until its key is disclosed. 
Once it gets the key in specified time interval it appends its key from that time interval to 
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the key list field in the reply and forwards the packet along to the source route indicated 
in the packet.  
Sender after receiving the RREP verifies the validity of each key in the key list, 
target MAC and that each MAC in the MAC list. If all of these tests succeed, the node 
accepts the RREP; otherwise, it discards it. 
Ariadne avoids false RERR messages by making each node on the broken route 
to authenticate the error. Each node that encounters broken link keeps the error in buffer 
and waits for authentication. The node that encountered the broken link discloses the key 
and sends it over the return path, which enables nodes on that path to authenticate the 
buffered error messages. With this arrangement a malicious node can‟t generate false 
RERR messages. 
 
4.3.2 ARAN:  
The Authenticated Routing Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [13, 18] is a secure 
routing protocol proposed by Dahill, Levine, Royer, and Shields. It is an on-demand 
routing protocol that detects and protects against malicious actions carried out by third 
parties and peers in the ad hoc environment. ARAN introduces authentication, message 
integrity, and nonrepudiation as part of a minimal security policy for the ad hoc 
environment and consists of a preliminary certification process, a mandatory end-to-end 
authentication stage, and an optional second stage that provides secure shortest paths. 
Each node before entering into the ad hoc network should possess a certificate 
signed by common trusted certificate server T. The certificate contains the IP address of 
the node, its public key, a timestamp of when the certificate was created, and a time at 
which the certificate expires, along with the signature by T. All nodes are supposed to 
maintain fresh certificates with the trusted server and must know T‟s public key. 
As a first stage, source node A initiates the route discovery process to reach the 
destination X by broadcasting a route discovery packet (RDP) to its neighbors: 
 
[RDP; IPX; certA; NA; t]KA– 
 
The RDP includes a packet type identifier (“RDP”), the IP address of the 
destination (IPX), A‟s certificate (certA), a nonce NA, and the current time t, all signed 
with A‟s private key. For each route discovery, node A monotonically increases the 
nonce.  
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Each intermediate node records the neighbor from which it receives RDP 
message. After recording as neighbor, it checks the fields of <NA; IPA>. If it had 
already seen the tuples it discards the packet else it forwards the message to each of its 
neighbors after signing the contents of the message. This signature prevents spoofing 
attacks that may alter the route or form loops. Let A‟s neighbor be B. It will broadcast the 
following message: 
 
[[RDP; IPX; certA; NA; t] KA–]KB–; certB 
 
Upon receiving the broadcast, B‟s neighbor C validates the signature with the 
given certificate. C then rebroadcasts the RDP to its neighbors, first removing B‟s 
signature: 
 
[[RDP; IPX; certA; NA; t] KA–]KC–; certC 
 
Eventually, the message is received by the destination, X, which replies to the 
first RDP that it receives for a source and a given nonce. There is no guarantee that the 
first RDP received traveled along the shortest path from the source. The destination 
unicasts a Reply (REP) packet back along the reverse path to the source. Let the first 
node that receives the RDP sent by X be node D. X will send to D the following message: 
 
[REP; IPA; certX; NA; t]KX– 
 
The REP includes a packet-type identifier (“REP”), the IP address of A, the 
certificate belonging to X, and the nonce and associated timestamp sent by A. Nodes that 
receive the REP forward the packet back to the predecessor from which they received the 
original RDP. All REPs are signed by the sender. Let D‟s next hop to the source be node 
C. D will send to C the following message: 
 
[[REP; IPA; certX; NA; t] KX–]KD–; certD 
 
C validates D‟s signature, removes the signature, and then signs the contents of 
the message before unicasting the following RDP message to B: 
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[[REP; IPA; certX; NA; t] KX–]KC–; certC 
 
A node checks the signature of the previous hop as the REP is returned to the 
source. This avoids attacks in which malicious nodes instantiate routes by impersonation 
and replay of X‟s message. When the source receives the REP, it verifies that the correct 
nonce was returned by the destination as well as the destination‟s signature. Only the 
destination can answer an RDP packet. Other nodes that already have paths to the 
destination cannot reply for the destination. Although other protocols allow this 
networking optimization, ARAN removes several possible exploits and cuts down on the 
reply traffic received by the source by disabling this option. 
The second stage of the ARAN protocol guarantees in a secure way that the path 
received by a source initiating a route discovery process is the shortest. Similarly to the 
first stage of the protocol, the source broadcasts a Shortest Path Confirmation (SPC) 
message to its neighbors. The SPC message is different from the RDP message only in 
two additional fields that provide the destination X certificate and the encryption of the 
entire message with X‟s public key (which is a costly operation). The onion-like signing 
of messages combined with the encryption of the data prevents nodes in the middle from 
changing the path length because doing so would break the integrity of the SPC of the 
packet. 
Also, the route maintenance phase of the ARAN protocol is secured by digitally 
signing the route error packets. However, it is extremely difficult to detect when error 
messages are fabricated for links that are truly active and not broken. Nevertheless, 
because messages are signed, malicious nodes cannot generate error messages for other 
nodes. The non repudiation provided by the signed error message allows a node to be 
verified as the source of each error message that it sends. 
As with any secure system based on cryptographic certificates, the key revocation 
issue has to be addressed in order to make sure that expired or revoked certificates do not 
allow the holder to access the network. In ARAN, when a certificate needs to be revoked, 
the trusted certificate server T sends a broadcast message to the ad hoc group that 
announces the revocation. Any node receiving this message rebroadcasts it to its 
neighbors. Revocation notices need to be stored until the revoked certificate would have 
expired normally. Any neighbor of the node with the revoked certificate needs to reform 
routing as necessary to avoid transmission through the now untrusted node. This method 
is not failsafe. In some cases, the untrusted node that is having its certificate revoked 
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may be the sole connection between two parts of the ad hoc network. In this case, the 
untrusted node may not forward the notice of revocation for its certificate, resulting in a 
partition of the network, as nodes that have received the revocation notice will no longer 
forward messages through the untrusted node, whereas all other nodes depend on it to 
reach the rest of the network. This only lasts as long as the untrusted node‟s certificate 
would have otherwise been valid, or until the untrusted node is no longer the sole 
connection between the two partitions. At the time that the revoked certificate should 
have expired, the untrusted node is unable to renew the certificate, and routing across 
that node ceases. Additionally, to detect this situation and to hasten the propagation of 
revocation notices, when a node meets a new neighbor, it can exchange a summary of its 
revocation notices with that neighbor; if these summaries do not match, the actual signed 
notices can be forwarded and rebroadcast to restart propagation of the notice. 
The ARAN protocol protects against exploits using modification, fabrication, and 
impersonation, but the use of asymmetric cryptography makes it a very costly protocol to 
use in terms of CPU and energy usage.  
 
 
4.4 PACKET FORWARDING ATTACK AND SOLUTIONS 
 
The protection of routing message exchange is only part of the network-layer 
security solution for MANET. It is possible for a malicious node to correctly participate 
in the route discovery phase but fail to correctly forward data packets. The security 
solution should ensure that each node indeed forwards packets according to its routing 
table. This is typically achieved by the reactive approach because attacks on packet 
forwarding cannot be prevented: an attacker may simply drop all packets passing through 
it, even though the packets are carefully signed. In the following sub sections we study 
two solutions which mitigate the effects of packet forwarding attack. 
 
4.4.1   SECURED DSR 
 
To mitigate the effects of misbehaving nodes Marti [9] proposed a solution. This 
solution proposed two techniques namely watchdog and pathrater. The authors first 
evaluated DSR algorithm in presence of malicious nodes. They found huge degradation 
in performance.  
Watch Dog: This method detects misbehaving nodes. For operation of this method all 
nodes in the network need to be in promiscuous mode. In promiscuous mode node A, 
which in range of node B, can overhear the communications to and from B even if those 
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communications do not directly involve A. The source node S relies on intermediate 
nodes A, B and C to detect malicious nodes. Each node on path will be whether its 
successor is forwarding data or not.  
Each intermediate node stores recently forwarded packets in a buffer. It compares 
the buffered packet with the overheard one. If there is match it removes the buffered 
packet. If a packet has remained in the buffer for longer than a certain timeout, the 
watchdog increments a failure tally for the node responsible for forwarding on the 
packet. If the tally exceeds a certain threshold bandwidth, it determines that the node is 
misbehaving and sends a message to the source notifying it of the misbehaving node. 
It seems that watchdog technique works well, but this is not the case always. This 
technique is suffered from problems like ambiguous collision, receiver‟s collision, false 
misbehavior, limited transmission, collusion and partial dropping. 
Ambiguous collision occurs when A receives packet from S at the time of 
overhearing to B. The following figure 4.1 explains this situation. Here A looses both the 
packets in collision. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Ambiguous Collision Problem (Adopted from [9]) 
 
In receiver‟s problem, node C gets the packets from both B and D at the same 
time. Due to collision C cannot receive the packet from B. Node A can only determine 
whether B has sent. Even though B knows about collision at C it will not retransmit the 
packet because of its selfishness. If B is malicious then it intentionally sends packets to C 
only when C becomes ready to receive packets from its neighbors. The following 
figure4.2 explains this situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Receiver‟s Collision Problem (Adopted from [9]) 
                                               1                         1                        2 
S C A B D 
                        2                                               1                             1 
S A B C 
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In false misbehavior, A may intentionally complain to S that B is misbehaving. 
By getting false information S may treat B as misbehavior node. But this situation can be 
detected easily as S receives ACK from D, node S cannot believe A. If A drops ACKs 
from D, node B informs misbehavior of A to D. 
Node B can set the transmission power in such a way that whenever it transmits 
A can overhear it, but C is not able to receive the packet. In this case A believes B. this 
situation is called limited transmission problem. 
In collusion problem, two nodes collude to drop the packets. In this case, node B 
forwards a packet to C and do not report to A when C drops the packet. 
As mentioned earlier, node A complains the misbehavior of B after exceeding 
threshold limit. But B just before exceeding the threshold limit forwards the packet sent 
by A. In this way B will be dropping the packets partially now and then. 
The other limitation of watchdog is, it is applicable to source routing algorithms 
only, this because whenever A wants to complain misbehavior it needs the source. 
Path Rater: As the name suggests, this method rates the different paths. To rate a path it 
combines the misbehaving knowledge with link reliability. 
Each node maintains the rating for every other node it knows about in the 
network. When the network is configured first time each node assigns 1.0 to itself and 
0.5 for other nodes. Using these values of nodes in path, path rater calculates rate of path. 
Rating of nodes on all actively used paths is incremented by 0.01 at periodic 
intervals. Path rater decrements node‟s rating by 0.05 when it detects a link failure 
during packet forwarding. It assigns -100 to the misbehaving nodes. A path with negative 
value indicates the presence of misbehaving node. By seeing negative value of the path 
the source node avoids that path for transferring the data.  
The disadvantage of this technique is instead of punishing the malicious node we 
reducing the overhead to it by turning the traffic to other path. 
 
4.4.2   ON-DEMAND SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL RESILIENT TO 
BYZANTINE FAILURES 
 
This algorithm is proposed by Awerbuch [10]. It works in 3 phases namely Route 
Discovery, Byzantine Fault detection and Link weight management. The first phase route 
discovery phase discovers the routes from source to destination nodes. The second phase 
discovers the faults in the links. The third phase Link management phase maintains and 
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manages the links. As we are interested in packet dropping attack we discuss only fault 
detection phase.  
FAULT DETECTION PHASE: The fault detection algorithm is based on 
acknowledgements (acks) of data packets. The source node after sending data waits for 
ack from destination. If valid ack is not received from destination within a timeout, source 
assumes that packet is lost. After a threshold number of packet loss, source node conducts 
a binary search on the path to identify the faulty link. 
The source node uses probe list for identifying the faulty link. Probe list is a set of 
intermediate nodes which are required to send the acks to source in addition to 
destination. The nodes to list are added iteratively, until the faulty link is identified. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the simple example of identifying the faults. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Fault Detection Process (Adopted from [10])
Trusted End points 
Intermediate Router Failed Probe 
Fault Location 
Good Interval 
points 
Successful Probe 
Faulty Interval 
Unknown 
Interval 
Source 
Destinatio
n 
Failure3 
Failure4 
Failure1 
Failure2 
Success 
  
 
 
 
 
SECURED VRP ALGORITHM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secured VRP 
 
 
Secured VRP for MANETs in presence of Malicious Nodes          
 
28 
 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
The success of VRP depends on cooperative nodes. It assumes each node in the 
network is cooperative and each node forwards the data packets whatever they received. 
But this is not true always; there can be selfish nodes which do not forward the data 
packets given to them. These selfish nodes do not harm the network but they decrease the 
performance of the algorithm. 
After studying the effects of Packet dropping attack on different algorithms, we 
got interest in knowing the effect malicious nodes on VRP algorithm. Section 2 explains 
our proposal and analysis is given in Section 3. 
 
5.2   SECURED VRP (SVRP) 
To detect and eliminate the malicious nodes in VRP we propose new algorithm 
called Secured VRP [12]. To mitigate the effects of misbehaving nodes we use the 
concept fault detection algorithm discussed in chapter 4. The fault detection algorithm is 
able to find the faulty link, but it cannot detect the misbehaving nodes. To detect the 
misbehaving nodes we modified the fault detection algorithm. For this we used the 
concept of promiscuous mode. 
The following figure explains the modified fault detection algorithm to identify 
malicious nodes. Assume nodes A, B and C are intermediate nodes.  Assume that node B 
is malicious node. With fault detection algorithm we can only identify the link between B 
and C is faulty. Here node B can be misbehaving by dropping packets or node C can be 
dropping packets. In our modified algorithm node S requests node A to observe B in 
promiscuous mode. Node A accepts request from S and observes whether B is forwarding 
and informs to S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Promiscuous mode operation of A 
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Based on the feedback from node A, node S knows which node is misbehaving and 
informs to all its neighbors about the misbehaving node. 
We propose few modifications to the existing VRP protocol to incorporate the 
fault detection algorithm. The first modification is each node in the network constructs 
and maintain entire path to all other nodes in the network. The second modification is 
that when a fault node is found the neighbors of fault node update their access vector 
with „-1‟, so that they permanently eliminate that node from the network.  
 
5.3   ANALYSIS OF SECURED VRP 
This section gives analytical analysis of SVRP. Let assume the scenario as shown 
in the following figure. In this scenario node 0 is having a path to node 4 through nodes 
1, 2 and 3. Even though there are multiple paths to node4, we store only one path from 
node 0 to node 4. Let calculated routing vectors of nodes 0, 1 and 2 be (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5, 
5, 8, 8, 8), (0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 2) and (1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 1, 3, 3, 1, 1, 3) respectively. We 
know that topology updates are made by means of access vectors. If a node finds any 
change in connectivity it updates its access vector and sends the updated access vector to 
its neighbors. The receiving node updates its access vector if the receiving access vector 
is different with its access vector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  Packet Dropping Attack on VRP 
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VRP algorithm is able to detect the link failures. It cannot detect the packet 
dropping attack as shown in Figure 5.1. Here even if node 2 continues to drop the 
packets, no mechanism is there to detect this attack. As node 0 does not receive ACK 
from 4, it continues to retransmit the packets to 4. Hence due to these retransmissions the 
objective of VRP (bandwidth efficient) is no more achieved. Our SVRP detects this 
packet dropping attack as explained in previous section and eliminates node 2 from the 
network and saves packet retransmissions to some extent. In this way our SVRP tries to 
achieve the goal to some extent. Considering the overhead, SVRP uses some extra ACK 
packets from intermediate nodes in the process of finding the misbehaving node. Even 
though we spend extra packets we achieve huge gain in performance by eliminating the 
misbehaving nodes. In normal conditions (without misbehaving nodes) SVRP works 
exactly as VRP.  
 
5.4 SIMULATION RESULTS 
We have evaluated the performance of VRP algorithm using ns2 simulator. The 
evaluation is based on the simulation of 50 wireless nodes forming a MANET over the 
flat space of size (1500m × 300m) for 900s of simulated time. We used constant bit rate 
(CBR) traffic sources with packet sizes of 64 bytes. The sending rate is 4 packets per 
second. We used 30 CBR sources. We varied number of malicious nodes from 5 to 20 
(10% to 40%) in the network. 
We used packet delivery ratio as the metric. Packet delivery ratio is defined as the 
total number of packets received at the final destinations to the number of packets sent 
from traffic sources. Figure 5.3 shows the performance of VRP in both presence and 
absence of malicious nodes. The number of malicious nodes is varied from 10% to 40%. 
Results show that performance decreases with increase in number of malicious nodes. 
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Figure 5.3 Performance of VRP 
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6.1 CONCLUSION 
 We have studied MANETs, its properties and challenges in the Routing. We also 
studied the different types of attacks and solutions to avoid those attacks. We studied 
VRP algorithm which is proved to be bandwidth efficient. Using ns2 simulator we 
evaluated the effect of packet dropping attack on VRP and proposed a new algorithm 
SVRP to overcome the attack.  
 We analyzed our new proposed SVRP both in presence and absence of malicious 
nodes. We concluded that SVRP works far better than VRP in presence of malicious 
nodes and works exactly as VRP in absence of malicious nodes. 
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